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ABSTRACT
A Nlcroeconomic Mod«l of soclom^tric Choice
Richard c« Roistacher
Canter for Advanced Conputation
University of Illinois
tjrbanai Illinois
The behavior of a person selecting a set of friends
from a larger set of aoquaintances can be analysed as a
consumer choice problem* The person can be regarded as a
consumer allocating his income among a set of goods which he
must purchase in quantities which will maximise his utility*
An increase in utility can come either from an increase in
expenditure or from a better allocation of resources*
Results of an unlimited-choice sociometric questionnaire
administered to 1 204 boys at eight junior high schools
showed that well-liked boys received the same number of
choices as others, but had a higher proportion of
reciprocated responses* It appears that social success
results from lower costs of obtaining information about
potential friends and better allocation of effort, rather
than from making contact with more people*
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A Nicroeconomlc Model of Sociometrlc choice [1 ,2]
One consensus of research on adolescence is that
adolescents tend to run in packs ^ and that the peer group
exerts a strong influence on adolescent socialization and
psychological development* In this paper, a model of
consumer choice is used to explain some sociometric results
concerning peer structures among junior high school boys*
A consumer choice model has three main components: a
set of choices, a function relating a set of choices to a
level of titllity for the consumer, and a set of constraints*
It has not been found either necessary or possible to
express the value of the utility function in "utiles*
Instead, consumer choice models can be constructed using
comparisons between relative utilities, rather than their
actual values* An axiom of such models is that a fully
rational consumer will, by definition, choose from the
available sets of goods so as to maximize his utility, and
that he will be indifferent between two sets of goods which
yield the same utility* Consumer choice models, both in
their strictly economic contexts and in the present use,
describe strategies of choice rather than the internal
processes which result in particular choices* The
definition of a xitility function assumes that the consumer
has a set of preferences and that these preferences are
internally consistent, but makes no assumption about the
content of such preferences, Nlcroeconomic models should
therefore be consonant with any model of Interpersonal
choice or attraction*
A junior high school boy can be viewed as having a
budget of time or effort which he invests in learning about
and associating with his peers. This paper will discuss
some factors which determine the size of the set of peers
from which a boy chooses his friends » and a consumer choice
strategy which describes a more successful selection by some
boys*
The adolescent 1^ the peer group . and the school .
Reports of research on adolescent peer relations are
consistent in stating that peer influence is at its
strongest during adolescence, ihere is also a consensus
that adolescents view the school primarily as a place for
interacting with peers, rather than for developing relations
with adults. However, there is some disagreement among
results regarding the nature and effect of the peer group on
the individual adolescent*
Coleman (1961) found that self-esteem was closely
linked to peer group membership and to social status* The
values of "leading cliques** centered far more on athletic
and social skills than on academic excellence* indeed, the
label brilliant student** was often applied to low-status
individuals outside ths leading cliques who were not
necessarily the best students, but who had failed to
distinguish themselves in areas more Important to their
peers • Coleman suggested that students may try to gain
status by Joining high-status activities and by attempting
to become members of high status cliques*
Roistacher (1972) obtained similar results in an
investigation of 575 boys at four junior high schools*
Members of larger than average cliques reported
significantly more participation in athletics than did boys
in smaller cliques* In addition, the grade point averages
of large-clique members were significantly higher than those
of non-members* ifhe congruence between school norms and the
norms of leading cliques was indicated by the fact that
members of large cliques in the four schools rated
participation in school activities as conferring more status
than did non-members* itiis was true even for large-clique
members who did not take part in such activities*
peer groups thus provide standards for evaluation and
behavior to their members, it can be inferred that the peer
group also provides social support for approved behavior
from a reference group whose members share similar
standards* However, allegiance to the peer group incurs
costs as well as yielding benefits*
Douvan and Adelson (1966) reported that the adolescent
peer group did not support the testing of new identities,
but pushed for conformity and hindered the differentiation
of self • Long, ziller, and Henderson (1968) found that
dependency, (seeing one's self as a part of the group rather
than as a separate entity), increased until the ninth grade
and then decreased*
Prom a roicroeconomic perspective, an individual's
membership in a peer group can be viewed as a choice from a
set of alternative compositions of peer groups, a choice
which incurs costs to and confers benefits on the chooser*
some patterns of costs and benefits may be idiosyncratic to
the individual, but others may be functions of social
structures and choice strategies which determine the
individual's place in a social structure*
Large scale sociometric research. There has been much
sociometric research on patterns of social choice in
schools , but most of it has been on relatively small groups
such as individual classrooms* in many cases, the size of
the sociometric group was too small to allow school-wide
patterns of choice to emerge* sociometric investigators
have generally constrained either the size of the group or
the number of choices a respondent is allowed to make
because sociometric data sets tend to grow unmanageably
large as either parameter is allowed to increase* [Davis
( 1 970 ) , Foster and Horvath (1971)]
fhe research reported here combines a sociometric
assessment of Interpersonal choices among a Izurge population
of Junior high school boys with a mlcroeconomlc assessment
of the choice strategies used by boys at various levels of
social success,
A sociometric questionnaire was administered to 1204
eighth grade boys at eight Detroit-area junior high schools.
Each sociometric group, consisting of all eighth grade boys
In a school, had from 128 to 202 members*
The questionnaire consisted of two booklets, each
containing a roster of all eighth grade boys In a school.
The booklets Included a two-point scale Indicating whether
the rater felt he knew the ratee well or just a little. The
booklets also contained two seven-point scales on which the
ratee could be rated as liked or disliked by the rater, and
as similar to or different from the rater. Boys were
Instructed to rate as many of their classmates as they
wished and to skip the names of those they felt they did not
know well enough to rate. In order to control for
presentation order effects, half of the booklets In each
school were alphabetized In ascending order and half In
descending order, [3]
lilSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HErE
The booklets were designed so that choices could be
made with a minimum of effort • it was hoped that boys would
rate even those whom they did not know very well, since the
discovery of best friends was to be acconiplished by
analyzing the rating scales, rather than by letting the
respondents omit all but their best friends (and worst
enemies)* "Hie result of using a roster, rather than a
fill-in instrument was not only that boys made more choices,
but that there was additional significance to the omission
of a choice, since memory and fatigue factors were leurgely
controlled. Boys filled out the booklets in special
administration sessions held approximately two weeks apart*
The total number of choices received and median scores
received on each of the scales were computed for each of the
1204 boys* The complexity and the develof»nental nature of
the analysis made it impractical to obtain a full
sociomatrix for each of the eight schools * Therefore , four
of the schools were selected at random for a full analysis
of choices given as well as choices received* [4] since the
original matrices ranged from 38 to 87 percent full, the
matrices of two- and seven-point ratings were transformed
into sparser matrices of ones and zeros representing "pair
links*"
First, the distribution of liking ratings each boy
gave was normalized around its median value in order to
control for individual tendencies to rate consistently high
or low. Boys were considered pair-linked if each of them
reported knowing the other well and if each rated the other
above his median in liking. The normalizing and filtering
process produced symmetric binary matrices which were from
11 to 15 percent as dense as the raw data matrices.
The binary pair-link matrix can also be considered as
the adjacency matrix of an undirected graph of points
representing boys, connected by lines representing
relatively strong mutual choices. A sociometric clique was
defined as a maximal complete subgraph, a completely linked
set of boys which was not contained in a larger completely
linked set. since the set of pair-links was still
relatively dense, the number of cliques in each school far
exceeded the number of boys. All maximal complete subgraphs
were extracted and each boy*s largest clique was determined.
A number of indices of social connectivity were derived
for each respondent in the four schools for which complete
soclomatrices were constructed. These indices included the
total number of choices a respondent gave and received, the
proportion of raters who reported knowing a respondent well,
the number of pair links and cliques of which a respondent
was a member, and the ratio of pair links to choices given
8and received.
Criteria of social succegs. In most sociometric
research y the criterion of an Individual's social success
has been '*overchoice*" The socially successful individual is
defined as one who is liked or admired by a relatively large
number of people* However, the results obtained from the
diverse sample of schools surveyed here required that the
definition of social success be extensively modified,
because boys in the inner-city schools tended to choose and
be chosen by only half as many of their peers as did boys in
suburban schools* Comparison of tables 1 and 2 shows that
the numbers of choices given and received were unrelated to
eighth grade class size, and were roughly inversely related
to total school size* In the four schools in which full
results were obtained, the number of choices a respondent
received correlated *741 with the number he gave*
Comparisons of socially successful individuals across
schools required the definition of a measure which did not
classify most boys in the suburban schools as more
successful than most boys in the inner city schools* While
it might be asserted that boys in the suburban schools are,
in fact, more socially successful than boys in the
inner-city schools, such an assertion cannot be made solely
on the basis of raw numbers of sociometric choices given or
received* it is valid to compare the absolute number of
choices received by two members of the same group, or the
standardized choice scores of members of two different
groups. However, comparison of the absolute number of
sociometric choices given or received by members of two
disjoint groups is invalid in the same way that the
Interpersonal comparison of utilities has been deemed
Invalid, "Therft is simply no way to compare absolute numbers
of choic-^s when there is no knowledge or control of
intergroup differences in choice criteria*
A more appropriate measure of social sucess, and one
which is comparable across schools, Is a normalized index of
how wMch a boy's acquaintances reported liking him. This
index, its concomiaitants , and its implications, are
discussed below,
school population di fferences
,
The inner-city schools
differed from the suburban schools in location, racial
composition, socioeconomic status, and turnover rate, but
only the latter charact'^rlBi. Ic significantly affected choice
patterns, A two-way analysis of variance showed that in the
two schools in which there was a significantly raciriHy
mixed student population, black and white students received
the same mean number of choices, indicating that racial
composition alone did not explain the difference in choice
patterns
,
10
A set of partial correlations showed that when the
correlations between school and socioeconomic status and
between school and mobility were partlalftc] oat, there was no
significant relation between a student's socloftconoraic
status (as measured by Duncan's (1961) index), or his
relative mobility (as measure«:I by the number of schools he
had attended) on any of the indicfts of social connectivity.
Students who had spent their entire Junior high school
cauref^ra in a single high-turnover school had about the same
number of acquaintances as did students in the same school
who had attended two or more secondary schools. Highly
mobile students in low turnover schools tended to know and
be known by about th<^ same number of others as did other
boys in thesf- schools,
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HHrS
A consumer choice model of friendship selection has
four parts:
1 • A set of acquaintances from whom the
individual will choose his friends,
2* A utility function relating the total
satisfaction received from associating with a
particular person to the total amount of time qpent In
associating with him.
11
3* A set of costs of Information about the set of
utility function described in (2),
4« A set of constraints on the amount of
resources (which, in the lack of better knowledge, will
be called time and effort) available to the person for
forming friendships*
Tfhe utility function. Assume that a boy, p, is faced
with the task of selecting a set of friends from a larger
set of schoolmates. For each schoolmate, q, there is a
function, u[T(p,q)], which relates a total amount of p*s
investment of time, T(p,q), to p's total amount of utility
from that level of time invested* It is possible to expand
the utility function <i[T(p»q)] into several functions, some
of which decrease over time, !• e,, into utilities and
disutilities, A disutility is not the same as a cost.
Costs provide a rate of exchange between choices, while
disutilities relate only to particular choices. Time spent
in Interacting with another person is a cost, because the
time could have been spent in some alternative way.
Exposure to the friend's bad breath is a disutility, since
it is part of the return from the interaction, rather than
something which could be invested in some alternate choice.
Ttie xise of a model based on the order of utilities
rather than on their numerical values solves the problem of
multiple (and possibly multidimensional) utilities. By
12
definition, the conBumer chooses the alternative with the
highest utility. If he chooses alternative a over
alternative b, then by definition, u(a) > u(b), and if he
cannot choose between them, then by definition, u(a) s u(b)*
A student, p, invests an amount of time, T(p,q), in
interacting with q and receives u(p,q) u[T(p,q)] as a
return for his total amount of effort, where p is not
forced to associate with q, u will be at least weakly
monotone increasing, since p would no longer associate with
q if he received no utility from the association.
Rationality dictates that p act so as to maximize U(p)» his
total utility, where
(4) U(p) « SUM(i*1,)c) u(p,i)
the total amount of liking he receives from K others as a
result of investing effort in knowing them,
A person's choice behavior at time s is determined not
by the value of u[»r(p,q)] but by its marginal value,
<^[T(p«q)]t i* ®*» its derivative at s. According to the
usual criteria of economic "rationality,** p should be
interested in spending time and effort in interacting with
the person, q, for whom the marginal value of d is presently
greatest. That is, at a single point in time, p should want
to interact with the other person who will yield the
13
greatest increment of satisfaction for the next increment of
effort •
Obviously, people do not associate with each other in a
vacuum, but must be engaging in some activity (including the
null activity) together* The question therefore arises as
to how the utility of associating with a person can be
separated from the utility of engaging in a particular
activity with that person. The chooser is really selecting
from a set of alternative person->activity pairs, and it is
the person-activity pair whose marginal utility governs the
chooser's behavior. Thus, a person, p, might have the
option of choosing to associate with person q in activity a
or with person q in activity b. While some activities aure
obviously valued for reasons other than that they allow
associating with friends, the investigation of the utility
of activities in themselves lies outside the scope of a
model of friendship choice. if a valued activity is
consistently associated with a particular person, then the
utility of that activity contributes to the marginal utility
of associating with him.
The set of person-activity alternatives available to a
chooser is well defined in Barker's (1968) concept of the
behavior setting. According to Barker, a behavior setting
is a standing pattern of behavior-and-^nilieu, such as
Eighth-grade English class** or **intramural baseball game.
14
A behavior setting is well defined in terms of time, place,
and appropriate roles and activities. A person's
participation in a behavior setting determines both the
activities and persons constituting the set of available
alternatives, and the amount of time available for
participation in the chosen alternative.
Since a statement of the relative marginal utilities of
each of a set of alternatives at a given time, s , is exactly
equivalent to a statement of the chooser's behavior at time
s, the criterion of maximizing marginal utility includes
both long and short term utilities, and both continuous and
segmented interaction with others, itie rate of decrease in
the marginal utility of interaction with another person
determines the degree of continuity or segmentation of the
interaction. If the utility to p of interacting with q is
relatively high, and if the marginal utility of the
interaction decreases relatively slowly, then p*s
Interaction with q will continue for a relatively long time
before its marginal utility to p is exceeded by the utility
of interacting with someone else. When there is no very
dominant alternative and when marginal utilities decline
relatively rapidly, a person will tend to segment his
associations, because the marginal utility of the current
choice will soon be exceeded by that of another alternative.
It can be shown that, once the value of d[T(p,q)] is known
for all q and for all levels of T(p,q), there is a strategy
15
which will maximize u(p) for any total amount of effort
invested.
Constraints on time and effort
,
JUst as a set of
utility functions describes the consumer's motivation to
choose among alternatives, a set of constraint inequalities
describes the limitations on his ability to consume. As in
the case of the utility function, the specification of
constraints may be more or less elaborate , depending on the
available data, or on the relation between various
constraints. For example, a researcher might be informed
that he could have only so many man-months of research
assistance and only so much lab space. If there were no
rate of exchange between lab space and personnel time, the
researcher would be subject to two separate constraints.
However, if there were some tradeoff allowable between
laboratory space and personnel time, then the researcher
would be subject to only a single constraint inequality,
whose terms inclvided both space and personnel.
While it might be possible to postulate numerous
constraints on social choice, only three constraint
inequalities will be considered here. one reasonable
constraint on p is that his supply of time is limited,
i* e.,
(5) SUM(i«:1 ,K) T(p,i) <« 1
16
where t is the proportion of p's available time spent on
interacting with each of K person-activity alternatives in a
particular behavior setting. If the data were available for
a particular individual, the inequality could be written in
terms of the number of hours or minutes available to him in
a particular behavior setting • In the absence of such
information, the constraint can be written in the normalized
form shown in (5) above. Conceptually, the use of a simple
time constraint is not very satisfactory. Time is a
measurable, but somewhat squishy, metric for effort or
attention. Obviously five minutes spent in the company of a
lover may represent a far greater total investment of effort
or attention than an hour of sitting next to a stranger, A
better set of constraints would be a time inequality, and an
inequality limiting effort-per-unit-time over time, in the
absence of any way to measure either the amount of
effort-per-unit-time available to boys or their expenditur-^
of such effort, the simplifying assumption WdS made that
such expenditure could be approximated by a constant. Thus,
the time inequality would over the long run, simply be
multiplied by a constant, since the time constraint
inequality has already been normalized, the value of the
unknown effort constant might as well be set to 1 , thus
bringing the time constraint back into its original form.
17
Constraints on the number of acquaintances
,
The data,
however, indicate that p must meet an additloa=il constraint,
that of knowing and being known by K* other boys in the
school, where K* is a function of the school's rate of
student turnover , l^he data show that the turnover rate in a
school plays a large part in determining the nunber of
sociometric choices a student makes and receives. The
average length of time a student Is exposed to th* coiapany
of another person is inversely related to the school's
turnover rate, Tt seems safe to assume that if two
strangers are constrained to spend a length of time in the
same place together, the norms of social interaction will
dictate that they acknowledge each others* presence to an
increasing degree* At the beginning of their time together,
the failure of one to respond to a remark or greeting of the
other's may be regarded as a tolerable degree of reticence.
At a later time, the same failure to respond may be regarded
as hostile or rejecting, A school's turnover rate
determines the number of others, K, who will remain in the
average student's social environment longer than this
maximum time. Most of an individual's friends are drawn
from this set of K others • The set of K potential friends
is decreased by the subtraction of those others whom p
considers enemies or rejects. If p rejects R of the K
others , then the K* & K - R boys remaining constitute a
constraint on his available time for choosing friends, since
18
he must allocate some time to each of them If he is to
remain on reasonable terms with them«
Thus, p's problem is to maximize u(p) by choosing some
number of friends , F, subject to the constraint of
inequality (5) and the additional constraint that he monitor
the K* - F others with whom he is on friendly terms.
Although there may be some boys who are universally liked,
it is probable that the average boy will have to make
contact with people who either do not like him well or who
actively dislike him in the course of satisfying the
constraint
•
Information costs » A third constraint is that there is
a non-trivial cost to p in time for learning the shape and
values of u[T(p,q)], i. e*, for monitoring the set of K* - F
others to determine their potential as new friends, it
seems safe to assume that no one has so much time that there
are no constraints on his ability to make friends, ihe
minimum amount of time, say M(p,q), needed for p to
determine the form, or at least the marginal value of
^[T(Pfq)]f will vary over individuals p and q. However,
when inviduals are selecting friends from the same group, it
can be assumed that M(p,q) averages out across the other
individuals in the group and is thus a function only of p,
the chooser. Call this minimum time m(p).
19
In order to establish a social niche in his school, a
boy must invest (K*)(M(p)) in making required social
contacts before he can begin to develop a set of friends*
Thus, whatever system he uses to allocate his investment in
friends, a lower value of m(p) leaves more time available to
be invested in friendship.
The process of investigating potential friends is
obviously not a one-way affair, since the activities which
convey information about q to p also convey information
about p to q« However, where M(p) is much smaller than
M(q), it is possible for p to become sufficiently informed
about q without the reverse being true.
Strategies of friendship choice*
Under the consumer choice model outlined here, a boy's
social goal in school is to maximize
(6) U(p) * SUM(i=1,P) u(p,i) « SUM(i«1,F) u[T(p,i)]
subject to the constraints that he spend (K*)(m(p)) time on
maintaining at least minimal contact with K* friends and
acquaintances, and that he not exceed his total time budget*
The model suggests several strategies for maximizing u(p)*
A boy, p, is exposed to the company of K others through a
process which is largely dependent on the school's turnover
rate* "The boy rejects R of this set of k others, leaving K*
as his effective number of potential friends* The boy makes
20
F friends y who report knowing him and liking him well, by
approaching P + N other boys* The N boys who did not become
p's friends report knowing him well, but are at best neutral
toweurd him, (The problems associated with making enemies,
cherishing one's feuds, and the utilities and disutilities
of social enemity are far too baroque to be considered in
this relatively simple model, which ignores interactions
between enemies •
)
The K* boys in p's effective social environment are
thus partitioned into F friends and N neutral boys who
report knowing p well , and A = K* - F - N acquaintances who
report knowing p a little or not at all, when p is not
exploring the possibility of new friendships, his time
constraint is
(7) SUM(i=1,F) T(p,i) <* 1-(F+N+A) (M(p))
since he must spend (K*)(M(p)) on maintaining nominally
friendly relations with everyone in {k*}.
If p wishes to attempt to make C new friends, then his
time constraint is
(8) SUM(i«i1,F) T(p,i) + SDM0F+1,F+C) T(p,j)
<= 1-(P+N+A) (M(p))
where the additional summation is over the C prospective new
friends.
The model allows two major strategies for maximizing
utility, A boy might be reported as well liked because he
21
has restricted his social environment to include only those
who like him well* A boy with F friends might choose to
minimize his overhead costs by minimizing !i>A and maximizing
R* If this were the usual strategy, well-liked boys would
give and receive fewer socioraetric choices than others.
Another possible strategy is to attempt to increase F by
making new friends among the A others whom one does not yet
know well. If this strategy is chosen, then a boy's
efficiency in Judging the payoff from an exploration of a
potential friendship becomes a crucial variable, sxppose
that the proportion of the A potential friends who would
become friends with p is a. If p made C choices at random,
his expected number of new friends would be ac« If p were
perfectly accurate in determining who would be a
satisfactory new friend, then he would make c new friends
from C choices. His efficiency in choosing friends is thus
(9) E = A F/C, a <a E <= 1
where a is the proportion of the A acquaintances who would
become p's friend, to the extent that well-liked boys use a
strategy of attempting to make friends among their
acquaintances, well-liked boys should make more choices than
others. To the extent that choice efficiency is important
in being well-liked, successful boys should show a higher
ratio of success in making friends
•
It should be noted that greater efficiency in choosing
new friends implies that M(p) should also be lower for
22
efficient boys, who should also be more efficient in
maintaining nominal relations with others, l^he sociometric
data presented here allow an empirical comparison of these
two strategies of friendship choice in a population of
Junior high school boys
•
Friendship choice strategies of successful boys. An
analysis of variance showed that at each of the four junior
high schools , boys who were rated above the school median on
the liking scale tended to receive approximately the same
number of choices as did boys who were less well liked by
their peers. Table 3 shows that the number of choices a boy
gives is positively associated with his being reported as
well liked. However, tables 4 and 5 indicate that the
degree to which a boy is liked is far more strongly
associated with the number of pair links he forms, both in
absolute numbers and as a proportion of the choices he
gives , "The school norm concerning how many others a boy
should know has progressively less effect in tables 3, 4,
and 5, while the degree to which he is liked has
progressively more effect, •fhere is no large interaction
term in any of the three analyses , indicating that the
effect is imich the same in all of the four schools.
The omega squared statistics indicate that school and
liking effects explain relatively little variation in the
23
data, a fact which is not surprising in view of the
complexity of the social system and the noisiness of the
data. However, the analyses in tables 3, 4, and 5 show that
liking is more than eight times as effective an indicator of
a boy*8 strong and mutual choices as it is of the overall
number of choices he gives or receives.
Insert TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
Table 6 indicates that the median liking rating a boy
received was also positively associated with the size of his
largest clique, and that the "liking** rating explained
almost three times as much of the variation in the size of a
boy's largest clique as did the school he attended. The
effect of the liking rating is so strong because the
number of pair-links required to connect a clique of n boys
increases as a quadratic function of n. Classifying boys on
the basis of the size of their largest clique tends to
select for boys with increasingly larger numbers of
pair-links as the size of the largest clique increases by
one.
Insert table 6 about here
Although well-liked boys were members of larger
24
cliques, these cliques represented a relatively small
proportion of the others to whom they were pair linked, a
boy's "concentration* was defined as the number of others In
his largest clique divided by the total number of his pair
links. In three out of the four schools, a boy*s median
liking rating was negatively associated with his
concentration index
,
Most of the indices of connectivity are higher for
well-liked boys, who make more reciprocated choices, and who
are members of more and larger cliques. Table 7, however,
shows that as a boy's median liking rating increases, the
proportion of raters who report knowing him well decreases
•
well-liked boys receive no more choices than do oth«ars , but
reciprocate a higher proportion of those choices* The
number of choices any boy gives and receives is far greater
than the number of pair links he forms. The majority of
those who rate a given well-liked boy, who does not return
their choices, report knowing him less well than they report
knowing others who do not reciprocate their choices,
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERS
Discussion
The data indicate that boys who are reported as
especially well liked use a strat-^^gy of efficient friendship
selection, rather than one of restricted ac^iuaintance or of
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random friendship selection. Table 3 showed that relatively
successful boys tended to make slightly more choices and to
receive about the same number of choices as do other boys in
the school, Hius, it cannot be said that well-liked boys
restricted th^ir set of acquaintances to a few close
friends. The somewhat greater number of clioices and far
greater efficiency of choice shown by well-liked boys is
consonant with a hypothesis of a relatively efficient
exploration of potential friends resulting from lower
information costs,
in order for p to recetv*^ d return from knowing q, it
is necessary that q like p, and sufficient thrit p spend time
associating with q, whom he lik^s , Tflne data show tViat a
higher proportion of the peer relations of well-liked boys
meet ^hese criteria a forteriori by (qualifying as pair
links. Tables 3,4, and 5 show that b«tter-llked boys had a
higher rate of return on their investment of effort in peer
relations by having a larger number of pair links, both
absolutely and as a proportion of choices given and
received.
Table 7 shows that the median liking rating a boy
receives is inversely related to the proportion of raters
who report knowing him well, a result related to the lower
Information costs incurred by well-liked boys. According to
the model, the well-liked boy forms more pair links but is
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reported as known well by a smaller proportion of his
acquaintances because he has been more successful in
identifying those other boys who will like hire especially
well, Tlie well-liked boy concentrates his effort on
relating to a selected set of peers rather than diffusing
his effort more widely across his set of acquaintances*
The transitivity of accurate evaluations* well-liked
boys' membership in larger cliques indicates that their
liking relationships tend to be more transitive than is the
case for boys who are less well liked* if a well-liked boy,
p, likes boys o and x, then o and x tend to like each other
more than is the case where p is less well -liked* o^^
possble reason for this increased transitivity is that
well-liked boys, by concentrating their effort on boys who
like them, serve as links between boys who tend to like each
other *
conclusions
•rtie theory of consumer demand provides a useful
strategic model for investigating friendship choices in
l2urge groups* It is especially interesting that one of the
model's major parameters, the set of choices, is so heavily
constrained by group rather than individual factors* The
consumer choice model, in both economics and in the current
context, is a strategic model rather than a model of
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Internal processes In the individual* The utility function
u[t(p,q)], assumes the existence of a set of preferences by
the consiiraer, but says nothing at all about the form or
content of his preferences. The model should therefore be
consonant with any model of interpersonal attraction. The
process by which boys choose friends is one of interpersonal
attraction, but the strategies by which more successful boys
choose are describable in microeconomic terms.
The patterns of acquaintance in the inner city differ
substantially from those in suburbia in ways which are
explainable in ecological terms. Turnover rate, an easily
measured but seldom used parameter, has a powerful effect on
interpersonal relations throughout the school. The lower
information costs of well-liked boys indicates that there is
an important cognitive component to social success in the
Junior high school. The boy with the requisite cognitive
skills will obtain a higher level of utility from his social
relations, regardless of the size of his set of
acquaintances • The Junior high school boy can be thought of
as surrounded by a network of friends inside a much looser
cloud" of acquaintances. The size of the cloud is heavily
influenced by the rate of turnover in the high school's
student body, itie higher the rate of turnover, the fewer
other boys are included in the cloud. Turnover in the
student body affects the size of the individual's network of
friends both directly by attrition, and indirectly by
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reducing the size of the population from which friends are
selected
•
The process of selecting friends Is, of course , a
mutual one. There Is no such thing as an Isolated active
Individual selecting friends from a passive set of
acquaintances* However, this simplification of a complex
process seems adequate to explain some of what Is going on,
and It would be possible to construct bilateral and
multilateral versions of the choice model presented here.
TUnese results raise some questions about the relation
of population stability and Its opposite to socialization
and educational outcome. Junior high school boys are at a
period In life when peer group orientation Is at Its
highest. If population turnover In a school Is very high,
then boys in that school must spend extra effort to cope
with the effects of such high turnover, it may be that one
of the functions of the immediate peer group in a high
turnover population is to insulate the individual from the
results of such turnover, if educational and socialization
outcomes can be improved by shielding the student from the
effect of turnover, then school systems should attempt such
shielding when possible, one step would be to keep students
in the saune school throughout a school year when their
families have moved to a nearby school district, it is too
early to make such a recommendation, but the evidence
29
Indicates that further investigation of the effects of
population turnover is in order.
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NOTES
[1] This work was supported by public Health Service
Grant MH-15606 and by the Research Board of the university of
Illinois.
[2] The manuscript for this paper is maintained as a file
on a PDp-10 computer, since some conventional mathematical
notation is either difficult or impossible to write in the
standard ASCII (American standard code for Information
Interchange) character set used by the computer, some of the
mathematical expressions in this paper have been written in
ways more amenable to computer storage and processing, in
particular, the capital sigma denoting a summation has been
replaced by an expression of the form SUM(i=1,n), where i is
the summation index which runs from 1 through n, weak
inequalities are indicated by ''>a:** for "greater than or equal
to," and by "<=" for "less than or equal to. subscripted
variables are written with their subscripts in parentheses,
e.g., x(l ) ,.#.,x(n) , for the elements of X, an n-vector.
[3] The usual instrument, on which a respondent is asked
to write the names of his friends or the names of the members
of a leading crowd, was not appropriate to such large groups.
A pilot study had shown that boys either refused to give any
serious consideration to a q[uestionnaire which required large
amounts of writing, or would give extremely stereotyped sets
of responses, often by copying each other's lists of names.
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Experience showed that a Junior high school boy faced with a
write-in questionnaire exhausts his patience long before he
exhausts his list of acquaintances
•
[4] schools 5,6,7, and 8 were fully analyzed.
33
TABLE 1
Demographic Charact:eristic8 of Eight
junior High schools.
Eighth
Grade Number Mean Missing
school Class of Boys Duncan % After
school Location Size Size tested S.E.S. White one yr.
1 suburban 842 284 128 34.23 100 4.3
2 suburban 1000 275 152 35.94 100 22.
3 urban 1483 430 202 29.90 35 36.
4 Urban 1214 256 124 32.56 6 42.
5 Urban 1461 562 133 27,36 1 32.
6 urban 1563 555 151 25.76 39.
7 suburban 983 320 168 50.12 100 7.4
8 suburban 1045 319 147 47.59 100 4.5
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TABLE 2
Number of Nominations
received by boys
at eight Junior high schools
•
school M % Mean S,D.(Bst.)
1 127 10,6 88.827 14.724
2 152 12.6 91.599 17.348
3 202 16.8 42.668 15.321
4 124 10.3 56.226 14.180
5 133 11.1 53.744 17.457
6 151 12.6 49.093 15.151
7 168 14.0 104,060 20.459
8 145 12.1 109.614 15.668
Total 1202 100 73.820 30.551
Total svan of Siiqares « 1120973.
For 8 groups, E^A = .8584
Sum squares Between a 796384,
sum squares within = 324589.
F(7,1194) sr 418.5
p « .001
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TABLE 3
Effect of median liking r
the number of nominations
atimj ami school on
a respondent madfi,
school
Liking Median 5 6 7 8
Below gcyiool Median 62,3133 33.8000 104.2500 117.3333
(9) (10) (24) (18)
At school Median 60.8970 50.5102 120.9843 126.1912
(68) (59) (66) (68)
Above school Median 71.8837 65.2381 130.7758 132,3333
(43) (63) (58) (45)
sum of Mean Oraega
source DF squares Squares F Ratio Squared
Liking median 2 9245, 4623
,
6,306»* .00810
school 3 566500. 188800. 257,663** .58740
Interaction 6 3698. 616.3 .841
AnOvA error 519 380500. 733.1
Totals 530 959943.
«» p < .01
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TABLE 4
Effect of median liicing rating and school on
the number of pair links ?i respondent establishefl.
Liking Median
Below school Median
school
5 6 7 8
14*3333 7.8000 18.6667 26.1111
(9) (10) (24) (18)
At school Median 18.2647 12.8305 26.8485 37.1618
(68) (59) (66) (68)
Atove school Median 23.0465 17.6032 39.9828 47.2000
(43) (63) (58) (45)
Source
Liking median
school
interaction
ANOvA error
Totals
p < .05; «*
DP
2
3
6
519
530
< .01
Sum of
squares
10230.
52450.
2297.
90040.
155017.
Mean
Squares
5116.
17480.
382.9
173.5
F Ratio
29.49»»
100.8**
2.207*
omega
Squared
.06369
.33463
.00811
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TABLE 5
Effect of median liking rating and school on the
number of pair links a respondent established as a
percentage of the number of nominations he gave*
Liking Median
school
8
Below school Median 22.5625 21 .0700 18.5208 22.8166
(8) (10) (24) (18)
At school Median 29.5146 26 .9711 22.4363 29.1587
(68) (59) (66) (68)
Above school Median 32.4139 28 .3552 30.4499 35.8043
(43) (63) (58) (45)
sum of Mean Onega
source DF Squaires Squares F Ratio Squared
Liking median 2 5821. 2910. 21.77»» .06922
school 3 2953. 984.4 7.363»» .03227
interaction 6 877.9 146.3 1.094
AMOvA error 518 69260. 133.7
Totals 529 417600.
p < .01
TABLE 6
Effect of median liking rating and school on
the size of the respondent's largest clique,
38
Liking Median
school
8
Below school Medan 5.1111 4.4000 5.2083 5.0556
(9) (10) (24) (18)
At school Median 6.0147 5.4576 6.0758 7,0882
(68) (59) (66) (68)
Above school Median 7.1860 6.7460 7.8276 8.2000
(43) (63) (58) (45)
sura of Mean omega
source DF Squares squares P Ratio squared
Liking median 2 347.6 173,,8 35.32»« .11007
school 3 144.6 48,,20 9.795»* .04231
Interaction 6 17.45 2,,908 .591
ANOVA error 519 2554. 4,.921
Totals 530 3063.65
«« p < .01
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TABLE 7
Effect of median liking rating and school on
the proportion of raters who reported knowing a ratee well
Liking Median
school
6 8
Below school Medan .3443 .3309 .5361 • 4624
(9) (10) (24) (18)
At school Median .3191 .3105 .4721 .4130
(68) (59) (66) (68)
Above school Median .2467 .2807 •4014 .3208
(43) (63) (58) (43)
sum of Mean omega
source DF Squares squares F Ratio squared
Liking mediar1 2 1.027 0.5136 72.18** .07222
school 3 2.211 0.7371 103.663** .15613
interaction 6 .09162 .01527 2.146** •00349
ANOVA error 517 3.679 .00712
Totals 528 7.00862
p < .05; »*^ p < .01
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